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Following the demise of the federal Defense of Marriage Act in
United States v. Windsor, the Obama Administration directed a bold,
equality-based reading of Windsor to immigration law, treating bi-national
same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples. This Essay argues that
the President's interpretation is both constitutionally and politically sound:
Constitutionally, because it comports with the Executive's power to
enforce immigration law and to guarantee equal protection under the law;
and politically, because it reflects the current, increasingly tolerant view of
marriage equality. Though still in its infancy, President Obama's policy of
treating same-sex beneficiary petitions generally the same as opposite-sex
ones is a model of presidential leadership on what would otherwise be a
controversial issue. While some might be concerned that the executive
branch is overstepping its bounds by creating a de facto national
immigration policy in the absence of specific congressional fiat and in the
midst of a robust national debate over marriage equality, President
Obama's directive embraces the promise of integrative egalitarianism, the
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hallmark of our post-Brown equality jurisprudence, by setting forth an
inclusive, uniform federal policy that enhances, rather than diminishes,
equality for all.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION: APPLYING WINDSOR TO IMMIGRATION
LAW ........................ 2..... ............. 2
II. THE IMMIGRATION LAW WORLD PRE-WINDSOR: ADAMS
AND DOMA .................. 6..... ........... 6
A. ADAMS V. HOWERTON, 1982 .............. 7...........7
B. DOMA, 1996 ............................ 11
C. PRE-WINDSOR IMMIGRATION WORKAROUNDS AND THE
GROUNDWORK FOR BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCEPTANCE OF GAY RIGHTS ........................... 11
III. THE WINDSOR CASE (AND ITS SILENT PARTNER,
HOLLINGSWORTH) ............................... 15
A. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR ......................... 15
B. HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY ......................... 18
IV. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: MARRIAGE EQUALITY
COMES TO IMMIGRATION LAW................ ................. 22
A. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO READ WINDSOR BROADLY ....... 22
B. INTERPRETING WINDSOR'S SINGLE REFERENCE TO
IMMIGRATION LAW............................ 25
C. OBAMA'S IMMIGRATION STRATEGY AND THE
NON-MARRIAGE EQUALITY STATES ........ ......... 25
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF INTEGRATIVE
EGALITARIANISM LAW ........... ................ 27
I. INTRODUCTION: APPLYING WINDSOR TO
IMMIGRATION LAW
"It was just kind of a shock, like winning the lottery .... The amazing
overwhelming fact is that the government said yes, and my husband and
I can live in the country we chose and we love and want to stay in."
- Julian Marsh'
American Julian Marsh was understandably ecstatic when he learned
Julia Preston, Gay Married Man in Florida Is Approved for Green Card, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/us/gay-married-man-in-florida-is-approved-
for-green-card.html?hp& r=4& (emphasis added).
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that his Bulgarian spouse, Traian Popov, would receive a permanent
resident card after the Supreme Court, in United States v. Windsor, ruled
unconstitutional the federal Defense of Marriage Act's (DOMA) 2
definition of marriage, which precluded same-sex unions. But in praising
the "government" for approving his petition, which specific branch or
level of government was the object of Mr. Marsh's gratitude? Was it the
Supreme Court, the immigration service, or perhaps the State of New
York which issued the marriage license? Most immediately, Marsh was
likely grateful to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
the executive agency responsible for approving the family-based petition.4
Ultimately though, Mr. Marsh should thank President Obama, who
directed all federal agencies to expeditiously implement Windsor now that
the national definition of marriage is no longer limited to unions between
husbands and wives.' President Obama appeared to read Windsor broadly,
as a signal to treat same-sex and opposite-sex marriages equally under the
law,6 and to carry out that mandate in federal immigration policy.
Following the USCIS's lead,' the State Department now recognizes same-
2 Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
4 See generally USCIS Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 203-21 (Sept.
30, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/PDF/PolicyManual.pdf (asserting that the USCIS
has the authority to grant petitions for spouses of U.S. citizens).
Quoting then Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, the USCIS website notes
that:
After last week's decision by the Supreme Court holding that Section 3 of
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is unconstitutional, President
Obama directed federal departments to ensure the decision and its
implication for federal benefits for same-sex legally married couples are
implemented swiftly and smoothly. To that end, effective immediately, I
have directed U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to
review immigration visa petitions filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in
the same manner as those filed on behalf of an opposite-sex spouse.
Same-Sex Marriages, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/family/same-
sex-marriages (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) (quoting Statement by Secretary of Homeland
Security Janet Napolitano on the Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of
Marriage Act, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 1, 2013),
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/07/01/statement-secretary-homeland-security-janet-napolitano-
implementation-supreme-court).
6 Interestingly, the Obama Administration has yet to treat same-sex "domestic partnerships"
or "civil unions" in the same light as same-sex "marriages" even within immigration law. For a
strong argument in favor of such treatment, see Scott C. Titshaw, Revisiting the Meaning of
Marriage: Immigration for Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 167, 176 (2013), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2322161.
Same-Sex Marriages, supra note 5
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sex marriages for immigration purposes so long as the marriage is valid
under the laws of the state where it took place.! Similarly, in Matter of
Zeleniak, the Board of Immigration Appeals approved this "place-of-
celebration" marriage rule by legally recognizing the Vermont wedding of
a same-sex couple that now resides in New Jersey, a non-marriage
equality state.9 Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
which oversees the USCIS, does not claim that the laws of a couple's
place of residence never matter, 0 it appears that exceptions will be few
and far between.
Judging from the enthusiastic responses from Mr. Marsh and many
other proponents of same-sex marriage, President Obama's decision to
expeditiously implement Windsor seemed to be a smart political move,
but was it the constitutionally correct one, as applied to immigration law?
Unlike Mr. Marsh's avidity for President Obama's broad
interpretation of Windsor, the legal blogosphere's response was mixed.
Former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Professor David
Strange contended that Windsor did nothing to alter U.S. immigration law,
which, notwithstanding DOMA, had previously been interpreted as
limiting marriage benefits to opposite-sex partners." Edith Windsor's
counsel, Roberta A. Kaplan, on the other hand, opined that the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) only prohibits fraudulent
("Q3: My spouse and I were married in a U.S. state or a foreign country that recognizes
same-sex marriage, but we live in a state that does not. Can I file an immigrant visa petition for
my spouse? . . . A3: Yes. As a general matter, the law of the place where the marriage was
celebrated determines whether the marriage is legally valid for immigration purposes. Just as
[the] USCIS applies all relevant laws to determine the validity of an opposite-sex marriage, we
will apply all relevant laws to determine the validity of a same-sex marriage.").
8 U.S. Visas for Same-Sex Spouses: FAQs for Post-Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. DEP'T OF
ST., http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/frvi_6036.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
9 Matter of Zeleniak, 26 1. & N. Dec. 158, 160 (B.I.A. 2013).
o Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, U.S. DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation-supreme-court-ruling-defense-
marriage-act (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) ("In evaluating the petition, as a general matter, [the]
USCIS looks to the law of the place where the marriage took place when determining whether it
is valid for immigration law purposes. That general rule is subject to some limited exceptions
under which federal immigration agencies historically have considered the law of the state of
residence in addition to the law of the state of celebration of the marriage. Whether those
exceptions apply may depend on individual, fact-specific circumstances. If necessary, we may
provide further guidance on this question going forward.").
" Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1982); Alberto R. Gonzales &
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marriages and does not explicitly bar bi-national same-sex couples from
seeking benefits.12 Similarly, Dean Kevin Johnson noted that "[i]t would
be far simpler for Congress to expressly recognize gay marriage in the
[INA]."3
This Essay argues that President Obama's interpretation of Windsor's
application to immigration law is both constitutionally and politically
sound: Constitutionally, because it comports with the Executive's power
to enforce immigration law' 4 and to guarantee equal protection under the
law;" and politically, because it reflects the current, increasingly tolerant
view of marriage equality. President Obama's leadership on this issue
provides a model for future executive action and reflects well on a
presidency sometimes criticized for its failure to adequately address the
plight of gay individuals. 7
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part II surveys the legal landscape
prior to the Windsor decision, noting how both the federal courts and
2 See Roberta A. Kaplan, Letter to the Editor, Marriage and Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July
19,2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/opinion/marriage-and-immigration.html.
" Leslie Berestein Rojas, DOMA Ruling a Victory for Bi-national Couples, but Legal
Questions Remain, 89.33 KPCC S. CAL. PUB. RADIO: MULTI-AMERICAN (June 26, 2013, 11:27
AM), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/multiamerican/2013/06/26/14103/doma-ruling-a-victory-for-bi-
national-couples-but.
14 See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009) (discussing the President's asymmetric powers in immigration
policy).
" See The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (supporting the proposition that the
President can guarantee equal protection under the law through his responsibilities to carry out
the laws passed by Congress).
" Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 States, GALLUP (July
29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx.
Personally, I would prefer that the government simply grant civil unions to all. Andrew F.
March, Civil Unions for All! Why the Government Should Get Out of the 'Marriage' Business,
HUFFPosT RELIGION BLDG (Sept. 13, 2010,4:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-
f-march/civil-unions-for-all-why--b_711858.html. Pragmatically, however, I doubt that most
traditional opposite-sex couples would be willing to give up their membership in the marriage
club, so I think it will be easier to simply allow gay couples to marry. Cf. Victor C. Romero, An
"Other" Christian Perspective on Lawrence v. Texas, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 115, 127-28
(2006) (arguing that Christians should embrace gay marriage laws as consistent with Jesus's
love ethic).
" For a brief timeline outlining the evolution of President Obama's views on same-sex
marriage, see Zack Ford, TIMELINE: Tracking Barack Obama's Position on Marriage Equality,
THINK PROGRESS (June 22, 2011, 1:20 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/1gbt/2011/06/22/250931/timeline-barack-obama-marriage-equality/;
Nick Corasaniti & Josh Williams, Obama's Evolution on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (May
9,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/10/us/politics/20120510-obama.html.
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Congress precluded same-sex couples from enjoying the same
immigration benefits as opposite-sex couples. Notwithstanding the
recognition of same-sex marriages by some foreign nations and U.S.
states, Adams v. Howerton18 and DOMA'9 acted as bars to federal approval
of immigration petitions based on same-sex marriages. Part III examines
Windsor in depth-what it did and did not say-along with its companion
case: Hollingsworth v. Perry.20 Taken together, Windsor and
Hollingsworth allow the executive branch to read these cases broadly.
This is especially true in the realm of immigration law, where the federal
government generally recognizes marriages based on where they took
place rather than where the couple resides.
Part IV takes a closer look at President Obama's application of
Windsor to immigration policy. Though still in its infancy, President
Obama's policy of treating same-sex beneficiary petitions generally the
same as opposite-sex beneficiary petitions is a model of presidential
leadership on what would otherwise be a controversial issue. While some
might be concerned that the executive branch is overstepping its bounds
by creating a de facto national immigration policy in the absence of
specific congressional directive and in the midst of a robust national
debate over marriage equality, President Obama's policy is both
constitutionally and politically sound as it embraces the promise of
integrative egalitarianism, the hallmark of our post-Brown equality
jurisprudence.
II. THE IMMIGRATION LAW WORLD PRE-WINDSOR:
ADAMS AND DOMA
Those opposed to President Obama's broad reading of Windsor are
accurate in describing pre-Windsor U.S. immigration law: it only
recognized opposite-sex marriages.2 ' Two legal sources-one judicial, one
legislative-support this conclusion: the Ninth Circuit's thirty-year-old
opinion in Adams v. Howerton and DOMA, enacted more than fifteen
years ago. This part discusses both Adams and DOMA, and describes
several legal workarounds within immigration law that allowed for claims
benefitting sexual minorities outside the context of marriage.
'" Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
'9 Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
20 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2' Gonzales & Strange, supra note 11.
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A. ADAMS V. HOWERTON, 1982
U.S. citizen Richard Adams and Australian national Anthony
Sullivan's marriage began as a whirlwind romance over forty years ago.22
They met in Los Angeles while Sullivan was visiting the United States on
a tourist visa. 23 After falling in love, they tried to find ways for Sullivan to
legally remain in the country, as his visa was set to expire.24 Upon learning
of a Boulder County clerk who had recently issued marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, Adams and Sullivan traveled to Boulder, Colorado and
got married. 25 Adams then petitioned the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) 2 6 -the USCIS's predecessor agency-to grant Sullivan
permanent residency as a citizen's spouse.27 Although nothing in the INA
explicitly limits spousal benefits to opposite-sex couples, 28 the local INS
branch denied the petition in an official letter callously stating, "You have
failed to establish that a bona fide marital relationship can exist between
two faggots."29
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the INS's decision,
and Adams and Sullivan sought judicial review in federal district court,
which entered judgment for the INS.30 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of the INS on the
basis of agency deference, statutory interpretation, and constitutional
22 These facts were taken from a New York Times obituary of Adams, who passed away in
December 2012. Margalit Fox, Richard Adams, Same-Sex Spouse Who Sued U.S., Dies at 65,





26 The INS was the predecessor agency of the USCIS prior to 2003. For more information
on the reorganization of the U.S. immigration bureaucracy following the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, see, e.g., Victor Romero, Race, Immigration, and the
Department of Homeland Security, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 51 (2004).
27 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982).
28 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 § 201, 8 U.S.C. § Il 51(a)-(b) (2006); e.g., 8
U.S.C. § I 151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2009) (mentioning, but not defining, "spouse" under "immediate
relatives" section). Interestingly, within the INA's definitional section, the Act also references-
but does not define-the terms "spouse," "husband," and "wife," though the primary object of
the section appears to be fraud deterrence. See 8 U.S.C. § I l01(a)(35) (2006) ("The term[s]
'spouse', 'wife', or 'husband' do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any
marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the
presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated.").
2' Fox, supra note 22.
* Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038.
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reasonableness.3' Without referencing the prejudice underlying the INS's
official denial letter or the BIA's affirmance thereof, the panel claimed to
accord proper weight to the agency's negative determination.32 More
importantly, the court was independently persuaded that the statute's plain
and ordinary meaning contemplated marital unions between men and
women only.33 Applying a most deferential34 rational basis standard, the
court found this statutory reading constitutionally permissible
notwithstanding Adams and Sullivan's equal protection challenge:
In effect, Congress has determined that preferential [immigration] status
is not warranted for the spouses of homosexual marriages. Perhaps this is
because homosexual marriages never produce offspring, because they
are not recognized in most, if in any, of the states, or because they
violate traditional and often prevailing societal mores. In any event,
having found that Congress rationally intended to deny preferential
status to the spouses of such marriages, we need not further "probe and
test the justifications for the legislative decision.""
In the post-Lochner3 6 tradition of applying minimal scrutiny for
socioeconomic legislation,3 7 the panel chose not to examine the actual
reasons for the law's enactment, speculating instead that Congress's
thinking may have been based on what may now be considered antiquated,
overbroad notions of differences based on sexual orientation.38 While it is
true that, even today, most states do not recognize same-sex marriage,39
" See id. at 1040-43.
31 See id. at 1040 ("[Tjhe INS, in carrying out its broad responsibilities, has interpreted the
term 'spouse' to exclude a person entering a homosexual marriage. While we do accord this
construction proper weight, we base our decision primarily on the Act itself.").
33 Id. at 1040-41 ("We think it unlikely that Congress intended to give homosexual spouses
preferential admission treatment under section 201(b) of the Act when, in the very same
amendments adding that section, it mandated their exclusion. Reading these provisions together,
we can only conclude that Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual marriages be
considered spouses under section 201(b).").
m In what Professor Gerald Gunther once famously deemed "rational basis with bite," the
Supreme Court has occasionally struck legislation while purportedly applying a deferential
rational basis standard. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1972).
3 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042-43 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977)).
36 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
37 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage legislation benefiting women), overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S.
525, 562 (1923) (striking federal minimum wage benefiting women).
31 See Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042-43.
3 Marriage Equality and Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage-equality_10-
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many states grant civil unions to same-sex couples,4 0 all states allow
infertile opposite-sex couples to marry, 4 1 and an increasing number of
individuals believe that allowing same-sex marriages better promotes
traditional family unity.42 Moreover, in the context of criminalizing
sodomy, the Supreme Court has questioned the imposition of a majority's
morality upon a vulnerable minority group.43 All this notwithstanding, the
Adams court's views reflected the prevailing norms of the time, and it
came as no surprise that the Supreme Court summarily denied certiorari.44
Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Sullivan was unable to extend
his stay or claim asylum, and the INS ordered that he be deported.45
Sullivan sought to have his deportation suspended on the grounds that it
would cause him and Adams "extreme hardship."46 He claimed that he
would be ostracized due to his sexual orientation and that Adams would be
unable to emigrate to Australia because he would not be able to secure
gainful employment due to his Filipino heritage. 47 Both the immigration
judge and the BIA denied relief.48 Ruling many years before his new-
found reputation as a sympathetic, if conservative, vote for gay rights
through his majority opinions in Romer v. Evans,4 9 Lawrence v. Texas,50
and now, United States v. Windsor," then-Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy
2013.pdf.
4 Id.
41 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Wlhat
justification could there possible be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual
couples . .. ? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile . . . are allowed to
marry.").
42 Adrienne Wilson, Note, Sanie-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 539,
545 (1991) ("Allowing same-sex marriages would, arguably, promote the same social goals
strived for in heterosexual marriages."). For an important, comprehensive philosophical
argument for same-sex marriage recognition, see generally CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY
OF GAY RIGHTS (2003) (arguing that society has a moral obligation to recognize gay rights and
that supporters of gay rights should make explicitly moral arguments).
43 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 ("Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code." (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850 (1992))).
' Adams v. Howerton, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
4 Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609, 609 (9th Cir. 1985).
46 Id. at 610.
47 Id. at 609-12.
48 Id. at 611.
4' Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
'o Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
51 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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upheld the BIA's decision as within its sphere of agency discretion.52 He
deferred to the immigration authorities' conclusion that Sullivan's and
Adams's suffering would be indistinguishable from that of other families
facing deportation, noting that "[d]eportation rarely occurs without
personal distress and emotional hurt."
In contrast, Judge Pregerson wrote a stinging dissent, criticizing the
majority for failing to scrutinize how "the BIA distorted or disregarded
Sullivan's hardship claims with abstract, generalized statements and failed
to evaluate Sullivan's special circumstances realistically."54 Pregerson
distinguished Sullivan's claims from those of other deportees, noting that
the BIA failed to take seriously the potential impact of discrimination that
both Sullivan and Adams would face in Australia:
The BIA also gave short shrift to Sullivan's assertions of employment
difficulty and ostracism by his family and former friends in Australia.
The BIA concluded that "[tihe lack of job opportunities or the existence
of a lower standard of living in the country of an alien's birth or
residence" do not constitute extreme hardship, and that Sullivan's
readjustment to life in his native country would be "the type of hardship
experienced by most aliens who have spent time abroad." These
statements distort Sullivan's contentions. Sullivan did not contend that
Australia had "fewer job opportunities" or a "lower standard of living"-
but rather that he, as a highly publicized homosexual, would be forced to
find employment in a country alleged to be much more intolerant of
homosexuals than the United States. Sullivan's readjustment to life in
Australia would be quite contrary to that of "most aliens." As Sullivan
points out, most deported aliens do not return to their native country as
virtual outcasts from their friends and family. And, most deported aliens
can return to their native lands with their closest companions. But
Sullivan would be precluded from doing so because Adams allegedly
would not be permitted to emigrate to Australia. 5
Taken together, Adams and Sullivan shut the door to noncitizen
same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens gaining permanent residency in the
United States. Adams affirmed the BIA's position that noncitizen same-
sex partners-even if they are spouses of U.S. citizens under state law-
could not receive permanent resident status in the same way that opposite-
52 Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1985).
5 Id.
* Id. at 612 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
5 Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
10
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sex spouses could.16 Further, per Sullivan, a valid same-sex marriage
would not prevent the deportation of a noncitizen same-sex spouse.5 7
Aided by the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari," the Ninth Circuit's
extreme deference to the BIA's position nationalized the disparate
treatment of bi-national same-sex partners and universalized a second-
class status for all noncitizen same-sex partners of U.S. citizens.
B. DOMA, 1996
By the early 1990s, a few states began to seriously debate the merits
of treating same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples. 59 In 1993,
Hawaii's Supreme Court became the first court to recognize that the
state's failure to accord marriage benefits to same-sex couples violated
equal protection principles.6o Three years later, the Circuit Court of Hawaii
held that same-sex couples were entitled to marriage licenses. 6' This
decision triggered a voter backlash, 62 and the state constitution was
amended in 1998 to bar same-sex marriages. In between these events,
and in reaction to these developments, the U.S. Congress passed, and
President Clinton signed, DOMA into law, limiting all federal definitions
of marriage to unions between opposite-sex couples.64 Any doubts about
the national impact of Adams and Sullivan were dispelled by DOMA. As
Congress's final word on the issue, DOMA made clear that all federal
law-including immigration law-would recognize only opposite-sex
marriages, thereby precluding U.S. citizens, like Adams, from petitioning
for their same-sex spouses to permanently remain in the United States.
C. PRE-WINDSOR IMMIGRATION WORKAROUNDS AND THE GROUNDWORK
FOR BROADER CONSTITUTIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF GAY RIGHTS
Although spousal benefits were not available to bi-national same-sex
56 See Adams v. Howerton, 458 U.S. 1040 (1982).
" Sullivan, 772 F.2d at 611.
ss Adams, 458 U.S. at 1111.
* E.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
6 Id. at 67.
61 Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3,
1996).
62 Baehr v. Miike, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/baehr-v-
miike (last visited Nov. 12, 2013).
63 Id.
' Defense of Marriage Act § 3, I U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
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couples, there were other ways for noncitizen spouses to immigrate to the
United States, namely-as employees, 65 as children, 6 6 as asylees67 or
refugees, or via the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program if they were from
eligible countries. 6 9 Homosexuality, like heterosexuality, is irrelevant to
many of these categories. 70 For example, sexual orientation is irrelevant to
whether one can be an excellent employee at Google or Cisco. Also,
regardless of sexual orientation, people are free to enter the diversity
lottery so long as they meet the eligibility requirements.
Sexual orientation, however, is relevant when a person seeks asylum
or refugee status. Gay and lesbian people may apply for asylum or refugee
status based on a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country
due to their sexual orientation.7' In In re Toboso-Alfonso, the BIA
recognized that one's status as a sexual minority qualified him for
"membership in a particular social group,"72 one of the enumerated bases
for seeking asylum or refugee status under the INA.73 In Pitcherskaia v.
INS, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a
homosexual woman who provided evidence that her government targeted
her because of her sexual orientation was eligible for a discretionary grant
of asylum, even though the government was not motivated to punish or
inflict harm. 4 Later, in Karouni v. Gonzales, however, the court clarified
65 Permanent Workers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/permanent-workers.
66 Citizenship Through Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/citizenship-through-parents.
67 Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 18, 2013),
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum.
6 Refugees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (April 11, 2013),
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees.
' Green Card Through the Diversity Immigrant Visa Program, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS. (April 30, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/other-ways-get-green-
card/green-card-through-diversity-immigration-visa-program/green-card-through-diversity-
immigrant-visa-program. See Sara E. Farber, Note, Presidential Promises and the Uniting
American Families Act: Bringing Same-Sex Immigration Rights to the United States, 30 B.C.
THIRD WORLD LJ. 329, 336-40 (2010), for a thorough discussion of the benefits, strengths, and
weaknesses of the alternatives to spousal benefits for immigrating to the United States.
70 See Farber, supra note 69.
" See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990); Asylum, supra note
67; Refugees, supra note 68.
7 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 822.
* Asylum, supra note 67; Refugees, supra note 68.
74 Pitcherskaia v. INS, 18 F.3d 641, 644, 647 (9th Cir. 1997). The BIA majority concluded
that Pitcherskaia was not persecuted and did not have a well-founded fear of persecution because
her involuntary treatment and confinement were not intended to punish her, but rather to cure
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that a foreign government could choose to criminalize homosexual
conduct."
Outside the realm of immigration law, the conservative Supreme
Court occasionally evinced surprising openness to gay rights claims. Two
cases in particular-Romer v. EvanS76 and Lawrence v. Texas7"-stand out.
In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado
constitutional amendment that outlawed equal rights "legislation,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government"
designed to benefit sexual minorities.7 ' Finding that the sweeping breadth
of the amendment belied its alleged interests in protecting landlord and
employer rights and in conserving government resources, the Supreme
Court viewed the amendment as a special disability imposed upon a
vulnerable minority, which was therefore, irrational:
We find nothing special in the protections [the amendment] withholds.
These are protections taken for granted by most people either because
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections against
exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ruled that the amendment
failed even rational basis review because it evinced "a bare . . . desire to
harm a politically unpopular group."so
A mere seven years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
found a Texas law criminalizing private, homosexual sodomy
unconstitutional."' Although written neutrally to apply to both opposite-
sex and same-sex sodomy, the state applied the law against a gay couple,
leading the Court to reconsider its conservative anti-gay rights position in
Bowers v. Hardwick.82 Again writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
opined that states violate due process when they criminalize private,
her of her homosexuality. Id. at 646.
" Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005). This distinction has led
Professor Michael Scaperlanda to argue that getting married is an act-not a status-and,
therefore, does not qualify for immigrant benefit recognition. See generally Michael A.
Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration Law, 11
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 475 (2002).
7
6 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.620 (1996).
" Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
7 Id. at 631.
Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
8 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
82 Id.
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consensual adult sexual activity, including same-sex sexual activity.83 The
Lawrence decision made it so all individuals were free to engage in
consensual sodomy in the privacy of their own homes, and overruled
Bowers v. kIardwick.84
Though correctly hailed by advocates as important gay rights
opinions,"5 the outcomes in Romer and Lawrence are not that striking
because the laws in both cases were particularly unjustifiable. Laws that
deny an individual the right to petition the government for political change
in the same way as everyone else (Romer) or that throw an individual in
jail for engaging in an activity that commonly takes place in homes across
the country (Lawrence) seem particularly mean-spirited, and as the Court
noted, irrational.86 Still, the conservative Court's acknowledgment that
vulnerable groups are constitutionally entitled to equal treatment and a
level playing field provided solace to the gay rights community and its
supporters.
In short, even as federal immigration law closed the door to bi-
national same-sex couples via spousal petitions," permanent resident
cards awaited those who could meet sexual orientation-neutral laws for
other family and employment categories, as well as those selected through
the diversity lottery. Where one's homosexual status-and not activity-
became particularly relevant, though, was within claims for asylum and
refugee status, where a well-founded fear of persecution for such status in
one's home country could be the basis for obtaining permanent residency
in the United States. Finally, outside of immigration law, federal courts
began to lay the groundwork for a broader constitutional acceptance of
gay rights, if not marriage equality.
83 Id.
m Id. Bowers v. Hardwick dealt with a statute that was written neutrally to apply to both
opposite-sex and same-sex sodomy, however, the State applied it to just same-sex couples.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188. Hardwick brought suit challenging the constitutionality
of the state after being charged with violating the statute but the Supreme Court upheld the
statute. Id.
' Sahil Kapur, Gay Marriage Supporters Optimistic About Winning Anthony Kennedy's
Vote, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Dec. 14, 2012, 10:05 AM),
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/gay-mariage-supporters-optimistic-about-winning-anthony-
kennedy-s-vote.
8 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
* See Richard Wolf, Gay Marriage Rulings: Experts Predict What Court Will Do, USA
TODAY (June 9, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/09/gay-marriage-
rulings/2405423/.
" See Adams v. Howerton, 458 U.S. 1040, 1042 (1982).
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III. THE WINDSOR CASE (AND ITS SILENT PARTNER,
HOLLINGSWORTH)
For bi-national same-sex couples, like American Bradford Wells and
Australian Anthony John Makk, spousal sponsorship was but a dream
before summer 2013."9 Wells and Makk had wed in Massachusetts, the
first state to formally recognize gay marriage,90 and like Adams and
Sullivan, petitioned the immigration authorities for a permanent resident
card based on their marriage. 91 Abiding by President Obama's directive to
continue to enforce DOMA,9 2 the USCIS denied Wells and Makk's
petition and ordered that Makk be deported to Australia.9 3 Because of
sympathetic congressional intervention and a pre-Windsor directive to stay
deportation proceedings,94 however, Makk received a temporary reprieve
while waiting for the Supreme Court to address DOMA's
constitutionality.9
A. UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR
The Windsor case was the vehicle to test DOMA's federal ban on
89 See Carolyn Lochhead, S.F. Gay Married Couple Loses Immigration Battle, SFGATE
(Aug. 9, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/S-F-gay-married-couple-loses-
immigration-battle-2336013.php.
9 Rose Arce, Same-Sex Couples Ready to Make History in Massachusetts, CNN (May 17,
2004,4:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/mass.gay.marriage/.
9' Lochhead,supra note 89.
92 While President Obama decided that DOMA was unconstitutional and that he would no
longer defend it against legal challenges, he nevertheless directed the USCIS and other federal
agencies to continue to enforce DOMA. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to
John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives 5 (Feb. 23, 2011) (available at
http://metroweekly.com/poligiot/LETTER_- BOEHNER.pdf) [hereinafter Letter from Attorney
Gen. Eric Holder].
* Lochhead, supra note 89.
9 An individual is classified as "low priority" based on all relevant factors, such as the
individual's length of presence in the United States, the individual's criminal history, whether
the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, and whether the person is the
primary caretaker of a person with disability. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to all Field Office Directors, all Special Agents in
Charge, and all Chief Counsel 4-5 (June 17, 2011) (available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf). Makk
met several of the factors specified in the Memorandum.
9 Carolyn Lochhead, Deportation Threat Lifted from S.F. Gay Spouse, SFGATE (Jan. 5,
2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Deportation-threat-lifted-from-S-F-gay-
spouse-2442468.php.
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same-sex marriage.96 New Yorkers Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer met in
1963, when no state recognized same-sex marriages and, indeed, several
southern states forbade interracial ones.97 Windsor and Spyer had a
longstanding and loving relationship that they celebrated in 2007 by
traveling to Ontario, Canada, to get married.98 When Spyer passed away in
2009, she left her sizeable estate to Windsor, and although New York
recognized Windsor as a surviving spouse based on the Canadian
wedding, under DOMA, the federal government still viewed Windsor and
Spyer as single individuals.99 Consequently, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) slapped a $363,053 estate tax on Windsor's inheritance, finding her
ineligible for the surviving spouse tax exemption allowed opposite-sex
couples. oo
Windsor sued, arguing that DOMA was unconstitutional and that she
was entitled to a refund of the estate tax she paid.'0' The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives intervened to
defend DOMA's constitutionality.10 2 The District Court ruled in Windsor's
favor,'03 as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding
that DOMA could not pass intermediate scrutiny and therefore violated the
equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause. 04 Because the executive branch continued to enforce DOMA,'05
however, Windsor did not receive her refund.10 6
In a 5-4 opinion issued in June 2013, Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, upheld the lower court rulings, but on different grounds.o7
6 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bolsters Gay Marriage with Two Major Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-
marriage.html.
' United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). The statutes banning interracial
marriages were rendered unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). For a
recent scholarly celebration of the significance of Loving, including several essays on the case's
implications for the current debate on marriage equality, see LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-
RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose
Cuison Villazor eds., 2012).
" Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2682-83.
9 Id. at 2683.
1on Id.
10 Id.
'0 Id. at 2684.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Letter from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, supra note 92.
'" Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
' Id. at 2696.
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After finding that BLAG had standing to defend DOMA,'0 Justice
Kennedy opined that DOMA discriminated against state sanctioned same-
sex marriages and failed to respect the traditional prerogative of the fifty
states to set forth marriage laws as they saw fit:
The class to which DOMA directs its restrictions and restraints are those
persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the State.
DOMA singles out a class of persons deemed by a State entitled to
recognition and protection to enhance their own liberty. It imposes a
disability on the class by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds
to be dignified and proper. DOMA instructs all federal officials, and
indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their
own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the marriages of
others. The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and
dignity.109
Although much of Justice Kennedy's opinion abounds in equality
rhetoric and specifically grounds its reasoning in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, the constitutional principle underlying the decision is
federalism."o As such, DOMA is unconstitutional not because states are
universally required to grant marriage equality to same-sex couples, but
because states traditionally have the right to decide whether to mandate
marriage equality, free from federal interference."' Thus, Justice
Kennedy's opinion does not force all states to recognize same-sex
marriage."'2
Immediately after the Windsor decision was announced,
commentators began to wonder how the decision would affect the tax
liabilities of same-sex couples that wed in a state that recognizes same-sex
marriage but subsequently moved to a state that does not."3 The answer to
1os Id. at 2688.
'9 Id. at 2694-96.
"0 See id. at 2693-94.
". Id. at 2693.
112 Id. at 2696.
"3 David G. Savage, Married Same-Sex Couples Uncertain About Their Taxes, L.A.-TIMES,
July 6, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/06/nation/la-na-adv-gay-marriage-benefits-
20130706; see also Chris Hoenig, Supreme Court Ruling Continues to Leave Questions for
LGBT Couples, DIVERSITYINC, http://www.diversityinc.com/news/supreme-court-ruling-
continues-to-leave-questions-for-lgbt-couples/ (last visited Nov. 18. 2013) ("The IRS and Social
Security Administration (SSA), for example, have historically determined a spouse by the legal
definition of marriage in the couple's state of residency. Under the current guidelines, an LGBT
couple legally married in New York or California but living in a state such as Kansas, which
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this question is beyond the scope of this Essay, but it illustrates that further
interpretation needs to occur within the realm of tax law, which Windsor
touched upon. The need for interpretation becomes even more evident in
other areas of law that require uniform and efficient application of federal
law. Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted a federal immigration law prohibiting
sham marriages regardless of the applicable state definition of marriage as
an example of such a law requiring uniform and efficient application.' 14
The Court could have avoided the federalism issue by ruling on the
merits of the marriage equality claim that, under the equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution, denying married same-sex couples the
same benefits as married opposite-sex couples is unconstitutional. That
avenue was also open to the Court in Windsor's companion case,
Hollingsworth v. Perry."5 Instead of tackling the issue head on, however,
the Court dodged it and decided the case on standing grounds-something
it chose not to do in Windsor.'16 Although Hollingsworth was neither a
federal case nor decided on marriage equality grounds, it is worth
mentioning because it could have been the vehicle for nationally legalizing
same-sex marriages, much in the same way that Loving v. Virginia did for
interracial marriages.1 17
B. HOLLINGSWORTH V. PERRY
In Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court was presented with a dispute
over California's Proposition 8, a ballot measure that amended the
California Constitution to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples." 8
Proposition 8 arose in response to the California Supreme Court's ruling
in In re Marriage Cases,"9 which found that a state statute limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the rights of same-sex couples
does not recognize marriages, civil unions or domestic partnerships of same-gender couples, is
not viewed as a married couple by those federal agencies. As of this writing, the SSA's
handbook has not been updated and still defines a spouse under DOMA's restrictions, though
the agency does say it is working to determine the path forward.").
114 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
" See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
116 Id. at 2668.
"' See discussion supra note 97.
j"g Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
"9 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008), superseded by constitutional amendment,




under the California Constitution.12 0 Both the federal district court and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found Proposition 8
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause because it failed to meet the heightened scrutiny standard applied
to discriminatory laws against a vulnerable group, like sexual
minorities.121
Judge N.R. Smith, in his vigorous Ninth Circuit dissent, cited two
reasons for why he believed Proposition 8 to be constitutional: (1) it
promotes "responsible procreation," and (2) it fosters an "optimal setting
for the responsible raising and care of children-by their biological
parents in a stable marriage relationship." 2 2 Proposition 8 advocates
contended that both theories were valid justifications for limiting marriage
to opposite-sex couples. 1 Under the "responsible procreation" theory,
Proposition 8 proponents claimed that limiting marriage to potentially
procreative opposite-sex couples serves a legitimate state interest because
it reduces the risk of irresponsible procreation (unintended pregnancies)
by providing an incentive to form stable families; however, the same
incentive is unnecessary for same-sex couples because they are incapable
of irresponsible procreation. 24 Furthermore, under the optimal parenting
theory, Proposition 8 proponents alleged that limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is rationally related to the state interest in fostering a
favorable environment for children who are, though debatable, best raised
by their biological parents. 2 5
However, neither theory quite comports with the realities of how
marriage laws actually function. First, if "responsible procreation" is a
valid theory for denying marriage to same-sex couples, heterosexual
elderly and infertile couples should also be denied the ability to marry.
Second, for the "optimal parenting" theory to be a plausible legal
principle, laws permitting divorce, abortion, and adoption should all be
abolished because they take children away from one or both of their
biological parents. Moreover, failing to recognize same-sex marriages runs
afoul of the optimal parenting theory because it thwarts the interest of
children who are already living in "optimal settings" with their same-sex
parents. As Justice Kennedy commented during oral argument: "There are
120 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
121 Id. at 2660-61.
122 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 1086.
24 Id. at 1106 (Smith, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at I107-09 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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some 40,000 children in California . . . that live with same-sex parents,
and they want their parents to have full recognition and full status. The
voice of those children is important in this case." 26
In the end, the Supreme Court decided to punt on the merits and
instead ruled that the defenders of Proposition 8-the initiative's official
proponents-had no standing to appeal an adverse federal court ruling
when the state refused to appeal it.127 Opponents of Proposition 8-
California residents who wanted to see their same-sex unions formally
recognized as marriages-filed suit against then-Governor
Schwarzenegger in the district court, and they prevailed on both due
process and equal protection grounds. 28 Schwarzenegger's successor,
Governor Jerry Brown, chose not to appeal.12 9 However, the case did not
end there. Because the original authors of Proposition 8 were allowed to
intervene before the district court, they filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
ultimately litigating the case all the way to the Supreme Court.3 o Writing
for a five-person majority, Chief Justice John Roberts found that the
intervenors had no standing to bring suit because they could not point to
any particularized harm they would suffer from Proposition 8's demise
that would differ from the harm suffered by voters who favored
Proposition 8's enactment:
[Pletitioners had no "direct stake" in the outcome of their appeal. Their
only interest in having the District Court order reversed was to vindicate
the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law. We
have repeatedly held that such a "generalized grievance," no matter how
sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kennedy contended that California
suffered a cognizable injury to its initiative process that the intervenors
were well poised to vigorously defend. 32 Because none of the Justices
reached the merits of the case, the Supreme Court's decision to dismiss the
appeal and vacate the Ninth Circuit's opinion left the district court's ruling
intact.'
.26 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No.
12-144).
127 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2668 (2013).
'2 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
129 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
'3 See id. at 2662.
.' Id. at 2662-63.
132 Id. at 2668-70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2668.
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While both Windsor and Hollingsworth say nothing about the merits
of the marriage equality debate, they suggest that the debate should be left
in the hands of voters and legislators.134 The majority opinion in
Hollingsworth opens by stating that "[tlhe public is currently engaged in
an active political debate over whether same-sex couples should be
allowed to marry."1 35 The Court's decision to deny standing while
acknowledging the political debate signals its desire to leave the debate to
the political process, at least for now. But which level of government-
federal or state-should carry out this debate? Perhaps an answer begins
to emerge when Windsor and Hollingsworth are read together: Because
Windsor reaffirms the longstanding view that marriage laws have
traditionally been left to the states and that, absent some strong federal
interest, should be respected, the Court seems to suggest that this debate
should proceed among the states, unless the federal government has some
particularly strong interest.136
At the state level, the debate continues: as of this writing, sixteen
states and the District of Columbia celebrate marriage equality, but the
majority of states do not.' What does this mean at the federal level? As
mentioned earlier, though not addressed in this Essay, there is some debate
about the implications of DOMA's demise with respect to federal income
taxes when same-sex couples are married in one state but reside in a state
that does not recognize same-sex marriage. 38 Of concern here however, is
federal immigration law. Specifically, Part IV contends that the ambiguity
arising out of Windsor and Hollingsworth creates the space for President
Obama to take a broad, equality enhancing position toward bi-national
134 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693-94 (2013); Hollingsworth, 133 S.
Ct. at 2659 (explaining that standing is an "essential limit" on judicial power as "[it ensures that
judges] act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected
representatives") (emphasis in original).
13 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
136 One might argue that I am reading too much into Hollingsworth as it was dismissed for
lack of standing rather than decided on the merits. However, given that this was a 5-4 decision,
and that Kennedy had some very strong arguments as to why standing should have been allowed
(just as Justice Scalia presented strong arguments against standing in Windsor), I do not think
that it is a stretch to read the cases together as evincing the Court's reluctance, at this time, to
reach the merits of the marriage equality debate and preference that the states continue to take
the lead, with the federal government weighing in on a limited basis, as the Obama
Administration properly has in the immigration context.
1' Monique Garcia, Signed and Sealed: Illinois 16th State to Legalize Gay Marriage,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 21, 2013, 5:01 AM), http://my.chicagotribune.com/#section/-
1/article/p2p-78265203/.
" Savage, supra note 113.
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same-sex couples within current immigration law.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: MARRIAGE EQUALITY
COMES TO IMMIGRATION LAW
President Obama's decision to seek full implementation of Windsor
has had profound consequences for bi-national same-sex couples, as the
USCIS has begun to grant petitions to noncitizen spouses regardless of
their sexual orientation.' 39 The positive response to Mr. Marsh's petition is
a drastic departure from the homophobic language used in the INS's
denial letter in Adams. Some commentators, however, have questioned
President Obama's directives and it is worth examining their three main
objections: (1) President Obama misread Windsor because authority over
immigration law is vested in Congress; (2) Windsor's single reference to
immigration law suggests a limit on state authority to define marriage
when it thwarts legitimate federal concerns; and (3) affirming same-sex
marriages for couples currently residing in non-marriage equality states
violates Windsor.140 For the reasons discussed below, none of these
objections are fatal, and indeed, President Obama's approach to Windsor
is both constitutionally and politically sound.
A. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO READ WINDSOR BROADLY
At the narrowest interpretive level, Windsor explains that DOMA's
intrusion upon marriage law, which is traditionally a state's prerogative, is
unconstitutional because it conflicts with principles of federalism. 4 1
However, relying on Adams, former Attorney General Gonzales and
Professor Strange argue that Windsor says nothing about immigration law,
which is traditionally a federal concern:
In our view, the DOMA decision does not appear to override the Ninth
Circuit's 1982 ruling [in Adams]. The Supreme Court last month
recognized the constitutionality of limited federal laws that regulate the
meaning of marriage to further policy-for example, in regulating
immigration-but concluded that DOMA was simply too broad, as
applied across the full spectrum of federal activity. At the end of its
opinion in Windsor, the [Clourt was very clear to confine its holding to
"those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect." Because
139 Same-Sex Marriages, supra note 5.
See infra Part IV.A-C.
14' United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).
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immigration is reserved to the federal government, the . . . states that
have legalized same-sex marriage (along with the District of Columbia)
cannot, by definition, protect through their marriage laws same-sex
couples seeking immigration benefits. 42
Gonzales and Strange conclude that unilateral executive action to
grant immigration benefits to noncitizen same-sex spouses of U.S. citizens
is impermissible.14 3 They contend that granting bi-national same-sex
couples the same spousal benefits as opposite-sex ones for immigration
purposes would require an act of Congress. 4 4 Indeed, Congress had
exactly that opportunity when, in debating the Senate immigration bill, a
provision allowing same-sex beneficiaries was introduced but then
summarily dropped as a political non-starter.14 5 That a gay marriage
provision was contemplated by Congress signals its awareness that there
currently is no specific statutory provision that allows noncitizen same-sex
spouses to immigrate, just as Adams held. 46
Congress's refusal to incorporate the provision conducive to marriage
equality does not necessarily mean it would oppose the President's
interpretation of the term "spouse" to enhance marriage equality. In an
influential article on inherent presidential authority, Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky proffered a comprehensive framework describing the
Supreme Court's treatment of Executive power, articulating four different
perspectives on when the President may act absent explicit constitutional
or statutory authority: (1) the President has no inherent power; (2) the
President enjoys inherent power unless usurping the power of another
branch; (3) the President enjoys inherent power unless Congress or the
Constitution specifically limits it; and (4) the President enjoys broad
inherent power, especially in the realm of foreign relations. 47
Applying Dean Chemerinsky's framework, Gonzales and Strange
appear to favor the first view-that the Executive enjoys no power aside
from that specifically granted to him by Congress or the Constitution.4 8
142 Gonzales & Strange, supra note I1.
'1 See id.
'4 See id.
145 Alan Gomez, Leahy Withdraws Gay Couples Amendment in Immigration Bill, USA
TODAY ( May 21, 2013, 11:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/05/21/
leahy-same-sex-immigration-amendment/2348763/.
46 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1982).
1' Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework
for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 870-78 (1983).
14 See Gonzales & Strange, supra note 11.
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They contend that because Windsor says nothing about immigration law
and because Adams recognizes that "Congress has almost total power over
immigration law," there is no explicit authority for the President to read
Windsor as broadly as he has. 49
However, there is another view: under the third model, President
Obama (via his designee, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security) may read the ambiguity in the INA broadly in the wake of
Windsor. As Adams acknowledges, there is nothing in the INA that
specifically limits spousal petitions to opposite-sex couples. 50 And as
Windsor sets forth, applying a uniform federal definition that restricts the
rights of same-sex couples that a state intends to protect violates
federalism principles.' 5 ' Further, the Senate's decision to pull the marriage
equality provision from its comprehensive immigration bill was not an
explicit rejection of the President's exercise of Executive power. Indeed,
there is evidence to suggest that at least some Senate members-including
Democrat Patrick Leahy and Republican John McCain-thought that if
the Supreme Court struck DOMA as it did in Windsor, there would be no
need for a provision permitting same-sex spousal petitions. 52
To the extent that the USCIS generally recognizes marriages based
on their place of celebration rather than where the couples currently reside,
the President is arguably free to grant the petitions of those, like Mr.
Marsh, who wed in marriage equality states. 53 Indeed, Professors Adam
Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have observed that the President sometimes
exercises de facto enforcement power within immigration policy, even
without an explicit grant of congressional authority.
149 Id. Because Adams read Congressional intent narrowly such that the INA does not
explicitly grant the President power to approve same-sex spousal immigration petitions, utilizing
Dean Chemerinsky's first perspective on presidential power, Gonzales and Strange contend that
the President was without authority to direct such a broad interpretation of Windsor. See id. As
Dean Chemerinsky notes, Justice Black's approach in the Youngstown case illustrates this
model. Chemerinsky, supra note 147, at 871; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) ("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.").
Iso See discussion supra note 28.
'"' United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
152 Ryan Lizza, What the DOMA Decision Means for Immigration Reform, THE NEW
YORKER NEWS DESK BLOG (June 26,2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/
newsdesk/2013/06/what-the-doma-decision-means-for-immigration-reform.html.
'15 See Chemerinsky, supra note 147, at 874-75 ("[T]he President may exercise inherent
power until Congress acts to limit him.").
154 COx & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 510-28. Although Cox and Rodriguez specifically
mention prosecutorial discretion as within the President's de facto delegated authority, the
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B. INTERPRETING WINDSOR'S SINGLE REFERENCE TO IMMIGRATION LAW
Theoretical models aside, Gonzales and Strange would still argue that
the Windsor majority seemed to urge caution because the only reference to
immigration law and marriage suggested limits on a state's ability to gain
federal recognition for its same-sex marriage law.' 5 Specifically, the
Windsor Court notes:
In addressing the interaction of state domestic relations and federal
immigration law Congress determined that marriages "entered into for
the purpose of procuring an alien's admission [to the United States] as an
immigrant" will not qualify the noncitizen for that status, even if the
noncitizen's marriage is valid and proper for state-law purposes.'56
Gonzales and Strange read this as suggesting that the Court intended
not to overrule Adams's refusal to recognize marriage equality within
immigration law.'5  However, Roberta Kaplan, Windsor's counsel, noted
that the specific statutory provision mentioned by the Court focused on
immigration marriage fraud, an issue that would apply to all marriages.'
A neutral rule of general application would not seem to bar President
Obama from using his inherent authority to read Windsor broadly.
C. OBAMA'S IMMIGRATION STRATEGY AND THE NON-MARRIAGE
EQUALITY STATES
While the Obama Administration has adopted a liberal "place-of-
celebration" rule that seems to favor marriage equality states over non-
marriage equality states, what do we make of the DHS's caveat that
sometimes the laws of the state of residence may matter?'"9 If part of what
Windsor advocates is respect for federalism, how does the Obama
Administration's immigration strategy respect non-marriage equality
states?
Professor Kerry Abrams notes that immigration courts have
Executive's enforcement power arguably extends to granting implicit benefits as well as
imposing burdens, as apparently Senators Leahy and McCain had in mind when contemplating
the effects of DOMA's dissolution on bi-national same-sex marriages. See Lizza, supra note
152.
1 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
5 Id. at 2690 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § I 186a(b)(1) (2006 ed. and Supp. V)).
m Gonzales & Strange, supra note I1.
" Kaplan, supra note 12.
159 Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, supra note
10.
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traditionally employed a more conservative rule that ignores the place of
celebration if the couple chose to marry in a different state to evade their
home state's public policy against such marriages." Abrams points out,
for example, that Wisconsin imposes a criminal penalty of up to nine
months imprisonment or a $10,000 fine for visiting another state to enter
into a marriage prohibited under Wisconsin law.16 1 While Abrams
acknowledges that Obama's more liberal rule impinges upon state
sovereignty, she concludes that it may be the most pragmatic solution in a
world where couples sometimes live in more than one state and move
frequently.162
To the extent that Windsor's equality rhetoric derives from its respect
for federalism,6 Professor Abrams correctly raises the specter of federal
overreaching. However, Windsor itself provides a way to break this
impasse by recognizing the importance of "limited federal laws that
regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal policy."'"
Here, the adoption of a liberal, equality-enhancing "place-of-celebration"
rule in lieu of the traditional one "implements immigration law's bedrock
principle of family unification," as Professor Scott Titshaw has noted.'6 1
Constitutionally, this uniform "place-of-celebration" rule appears to
be a fair reading of Lawrence v. Texas, which precluded a state from
imposing its morals on a vulnerable minority. 66 As applied here, non-
marriage equality states should not be able to curtail immigration benefits
recognized by the federal government based on a neutral "place-of-
'6 Kerry Abrams, Marriage and Immigration -Which State's Law Applies?, CONCURRING




163 For a different perspective on this, see Titshaw, supra note 6, at 171 ("Although the
majority opinion in United States v. Windsor included a great deal of language about Section 3
of DOMA undermining states' traditional authority over family law, federalism was not its
ultimate rationale. In the end, Justice Kennedy found it 'unnecessary to decide whether the
federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal
balance' since DOMA presents discrimination of an unusual character and thereby 'violates
basic due process and equal protection principles' guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. On this
point, the opinion echoed the refrains of equality, personhood[,] and dignity in choice of
intimate and familial relationships that featured prominently in Justice Kennedy's opinions in
Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans. These ideas also support a unified place-of-celebration
rule for marriage validity.").
'" United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013).
165 Titshaw, supra note 6, at 171.
'6 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); supra text accompanying notes 84-
85.
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celebration" rule. Indeed, such a policy furthers the equality-based aspects
of Windsor, granting same-sex couples the same advantages opposite-sex
couples currently enjoy under federal immigration law. Finally,
Hollingsworth teaches that it would be exceedingly difficult for those who
reside in non-marriage equality states to claim sufficient harm to challenge
the Obama Administration's policy, which does not curtail any rights or
privileges under state law.167 Any objection would, therefore, amount to
only a generalized grievance against this federal directive. 68
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF INTEGRATIVE
EGALITARIANISM
While we await the full development of this new immigration
initiative, President Obama's reading of Windsor is constitutionally sound
and politically bold. If, as it appears, the trend is toward greater
recognition of same-sex marriages across the states, then we can anticipate
more bi-national same-sex couples marrying in one of the seventeen U.S.
marriage equality jurisdictions and petitioning the federal government for
status adjustments for the noncitizen spouse.
The President's reading of Windsor is also consistent with our
modern post-Brown equality jurisprudence. President Obama's reading
exemplifies what I have termed "integrative egalitarianism," the idea that
"governmental programs . . .designed to overcome arbitrary inequalities
stemming from accidents of birth are a worthwhile investment in society's
future."l 69 The President's reading helps to integrate outsiders by
extending the benefits of marriage to noncitizen spouses and ensures
equality by treating same-sex couples the same as opposite-sex couples
under federal immigration law.
Thus far, the President's leadership has highlighted aspects of
Windsor's promises of equality while respecting federalism concerns,
which appeared to animate the majority's decision. Indeed, the President's
leadership may spur the march to marriage equality if more beneficiaries
turn to activism. Following the grant of their petition, Mr. Marsh and Mr.
Popov told the New York Times that they planned to "become same-sex
marriage activists in Florida, a state that does not recognize such unions.
'We are first-class citizens in New York and in the eyes of the federal
67 See supra Part 111.B.
* See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2666 (2013).
'6 Victor C. Romero, Immigrant Education and the Promise of Integrative Egalitarianism,
2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 275, 276-77 (2011).
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government, but second-class citizens in Florida,' Mr. Marsh said. 'We
won't stand for that."' 70
170 Preston, supra note 1.
COMMENT

